Abstract To overcome the problem of attacks on networks, new Intrusion Detection System (IDS) approaches have been proposed in recent years. They consist in identifying signatures of known attacks to compare them to each request and determine whether it is an attack or not. However, these methods are set to default when the attack is unknown from the database of signatures. Usually this problem is solved by calling human expertise to update the database of signatures. However, it is frequent that an attack has already been detected by another organization and it would be useful to be able to benefit from this knowledge to enrich the database of signatures. Unfortunately this information is not so easy to obtain. In fact organizations do not necessarily want to spread the information that they have already faced this type of attack. In this paper we propose a new approach to intrusion detection in a collaborative environment but by preserving the privacy of the collaborative organizations. Our approach works for any signature that may be written as a regular expression insuring that no information is disclosed on the content of the sites.
Introduction
The fast growing computational Grid environments has increased risk of attack and intrusion. Thus misuse detection has become a real concern for companies and organizations. Whereas earlier attacks focused on Web servers which were often misconfigured or poorly maintained, the most recent ones take advantage of Security service and Web application weaknesses which become more vulnerable [6, 5, 3] . To overcome this problem, new approaches called Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been developed. Installed on networks, they aim to analyze traffic requests and detect malicious behavior (eg Prelude-IDS, Snort). They can be classified into two broad categories( e.g. [11, 12] ): the Anomaly Detection Systems which attempt to detect attacks and the Abuse Detection Systems which detects unknown comportement so called abuse from a specification of allowed ones. Within this paper, we particulary focus on anomaly detection. Their principle mostly consist of matching new requests which signatures of attacks represented as regular expressions. For example, an attack which seeks to recover the password file of a system (e.g. .)*/etc/passwd. These signatures are often obtained by using machine learning techniques or from specialized sites (e.g. OSVDB [2] )
Even if these systems are widely used today, the essential problem is that they do not know how to manage attacks outside their own signature database. When a request is not recognized by the IDS, an alarm is triggered to require external valuation.
Recently approaches called Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems (CIDS) (e.g. [1, 15, 8, 10, 14] ) have been proposed. In comparison with isolated IDS, CIDS significantly improve time and efficiency of misuse detections by sharing information on attacks between distributed IDS from one or more organizations. The main principle of these approaches is to exchange information using peer to peer links. However the exchanged information are mostly limited to IP addresses of requests (e.g. [1, 8, 10] ) and consider that data can be freely exchanged among the peers. The last constraint is very strong: companies, for reasons of confidentiality, do not want to spread out that they were attacked and therefore are unwilling to give any information on it. In this article we propose a secure collaborative detection approach, called SREXM (Secure Regular Expression Mapping), which ensures that private data will not be disclosed. Via our approach, regular expressions from the various collaborative sites can be matched without disclosing any information from the local IDS to the outside. Collaborative sites are free to work with signatures of attacks or non-attacks and may give information on the type of intrusion detected. Thus, when new request is checked, the response will be one of: it is an attack (with its type if available), it is a non-attack, or undefined (if none of the IDS data leads to a positive or negative conclusion). To our knowledge, very few studies are concerned with this topic of security in such collaborative environment. The only works [13, 10] consider both collaborative and security aspects. In its context, security mainly concerns information on IP addresses and ports. It uses Bloom's filters to manage data exchanges. Our problem is different in that, we want to exchange data, i.e. more complex than IP addresses and ports. In fact we wants to exchange and parse regular expressions on the full request.
The article is organized as follows. In section 1.2, we present the problem. An overview of our approach is given in section 1.3. The various algorithms are described in section 1.4. Finally section 1.5 concludes and presents various perspectives.
Problem statement
DB is a database such as DB = DB 1 DB 2 ... DB D . Each database DB i is equivalent to a tuple < id, S exp > where id is the identifier of the database and S exp is a set of regular expressions. Each regular expression exp i ∈ S exp is expressed as a deterministic automaton (e.g. [7] ) by the tuple a exp i =< State, Trans, Init, Final >. In this tuple a exp i , State is the set of states of the automaton, Init is the initial state, Final is the set of final states and Trans is the set of transitions. Each transition is a quadruplet (S Initial , Condition, S Final , Length) meaning that if the automaton is in state S Initial and that Condition is checked then automaton current state changes to S Final and move the current position in the filtered string of the amount given by Length. In our approach, we also associate a value to each final state. This value is used to specify whether or not it is an attack (boolean 0 or 1), but may also provide the type of the attack (integer). Figure 1 
Example 1 Consider the following regular expression: (/[ˆ./]*/..)*/etc/passwd. Its associated automaton is described in

Definition 1
Given a database DB = DB 1 DB 2 ... DB D and a request string R, the securized approach in such a collaborative environment consist in finding a regular expression exp from DB such that matching(exp, R) = T RUE while ensuring that none of the databases DB i provide any information from its content to anyone.
The SREXM approach
This section will provide an overview of the secure architecture SREXM (Secure Regular Expression Mapping). It is to answer the problem of privacy preserving in a collaborative environment. Inspired by the work of [9] , this architecture offers the advantage of achieving the various operations while ensuring that neither party may have access to private data contained in the initial databases. In addition to the client site S which is responsible to provide the request to be tested, the architecture 13 .. cond 14 passwd requires four non-collaborative and semi honest sites [4] : they follow the protocol correctly, but are free to use the information they have collected during the execution of the protocol. These independent sites collect, store and evaluate information in a secure way. The different functions provided by these sites are:
• The Control Site CT RL: CT RL is used to rule the various operations needed to match the regular expression. To do this, it interacts with the two non colluding sites NC 1 and NC 2 .
• Non Colluding Sites NC 1 and NC 2 : These two symmetric sites collect garbled data from all databases as well as the garbled request to be tested from S. Under the control of CT RL and by interaction with PS, they perform several secure
lirmm-00430642, version 1 -9 Nov 2009
operations in order to insure that none of them will be able to infer any of the intermediate results or the final result which is returned to site S.
• The Processing Site PS: This site is used both by NC 1 and NC 2 to process, the various operations needed, in a secure way. Like NC 1 and NC 2 , PS also cannot deduce any pertinent value of intermediate or final result from the data it processes.
The exchange of data between the different sites is done by using the secure method SEND S ( 
This method is used in particular to send the data from the databases DB i and to send the request from site S. Thus, the process described in figure 1.2 starts in the following way. First, the site S sends its request to NC 1 and NC 2 using the SEND S method (See arrow number 1 in figure 1 .2). More precisely, the request R is taken in its boolean form: a vector of bits. A random vector of bits A R is then generated with the same size as the request R to compute the new vector Z R = A R R. Z R is sent to NC 1 and A R to NC 2 (or vice versa). Each database DB i decompose the transition matrix in three tables: the first contains the transitions of the automaton, the second the conditions and the third the lengths of the shifts. To encode the transition matrix, the indexes of these tables are randomly mixed. The databases first send the table of transition to CT RL, then, using SEND S , the associated tables of conditions and lengths are sent to NC 1 and NC 2 in the same order of indexes as the one used when sent to CT RL (See arrow number 2). From this point, the computation of the request is done under the control of CT RL. Via the NCOMPARE S , it will ask NC 1 and NC 2 to test the condition of index i from the table of conditions (See arrow number 3). At this point, NC 1 has part of the request to be tested ST R i ). The next step consist in the comparison of the two string in a secure way. This is performed by sending requested data to PS using the NCMP S protocol (See arrow number 4). Under completion, the result of the comparison is divided in two parts, one is owned by NC 1 and the other by NC 2 such that none are able to infer its real value. Both parts are then securely returned to CT RL (see arrows 5 and 6) which uses the result to change the state of the automaton. The process is repeated under control of CT RL unless the automaton is ended (it moves to a final state of the automaton or the request does not match). The action of maintaining the position pos in the request is done by CT RL through the secure operation INCR S whose aim is to shift the position according to the displacement length associated with the transition. This is done by sending the index in the table of lengthes to NC 1 and NC 2 that will update the value of pos. When the automaton reaches a final state, CT RL or matching of the request fails, CT RL aggregates the results (attack, nonattack, unknown) using the secure method AGGREGAT E S . The aggregated result is split between NC 1 and NC 2 and kept while data has to be performed on the same request. At the end of the process, the final aggregated result is sent to S.
The Secure Algorithms
In this section, we present the various algorithms used in SREXM approach. In order to simplify writing, we consider the following notations: Let ( 1 or NC 2 to get knowledge on the result of the comparison. They can only deduce the length of left part of the request which have been successfully matched by the automaton (in fact the value of pos). But even if they could obtain the list of strings that has been matched successfully, as they only hold random data in the table of condition, they can only infer that a random sequence of length pos has matched the beginning of the request. However, they can not deduce neither whether the filtering was successful or not nor the value associated with the final state in case of successful filtering. At the level of CT RL no information on the length of the filtered part of the query can be inferred. Indeed CT RL has no access to the real data (request, condition strings, lengthes). It only knows indexes. The only information it can obtain is the path followed by the automaton to provide an answer.
COMPARE S does not allow NC
The algorithm INCR S
The request R to be tested is split between NC 1 and NC 2 , in a secure way. The starting position pos is known by both NC 1 and NC 2 . Any modification to this position is controlled by CT RL via the INCR S (len|len) operation. When the automaton is sent to CT RL and data to NC 1 and NC 2 , these two also receives a table with indexes aleatory sorted and which contains the lengths of movements. The goal of this sort is to avoid any direct correspondence between the index of conditions and lengths. The INCR S method just sends the index to be used to NC 1 and NC 2 and each one updates the position pos according to the value found in the table.
When an increment is triggered by CT RL, there is no way for NC 1 or NC 2 to know which condition had activated it. In fact CT RL may execute unnecessary computation. On CT RL side, neither the information of the length may be available nor inferred as it knows only indexes.
The algorithm AGGREGAT E S
Aggregation of results simply consists to securely retain the first valid result obtained by CT RL, i.e. when an automaton has matched the request and lead in a final state. The objective of AGGREGAT E S is to conceal from NC 1 and NC 2 , the fact that an automaton has filtered the request (and associated value W f ) or not. This is done by setting a state bit to 1 if the automaton has filtered the request and 0 otherwise. Depending on the value of this bit, the information stored in the accumulator between NC 1 and NC 2 will be either the value of the final state W f or a random vector. The implementation of AGGREGAT E S require the secure operators S (
which implements respectively a secure computation of bitwise operators OR and AND on vectors of bits of same length (S 1 and S 2 ) and returns the sequence V . At the end of the process SREXM, NC 1 and NC 2 both sends the value of their part of the accumulator to the client site S. Finally S has just need to take XOR of the received values to get the result. AGGREGAT E S has been used.
Complexity: The methods
S and S are used 2n + 1 and n times respectively on one bit. By reusing the complexity of operators S and S (see section 1.4.4), NC 1 and NC 2 therefore perform 34n + 12 binary operations, generate 6n + 2 aleatory bits, send 12n + 4 bits and receive 10n + 4 bits (including parameters). PS performs 12n + 4 binary operations, generates 3n + 1 aleatory bits, receives 12n + 4 bits (6n + 2 from NC 1 and NC 2 each) and sends 6n + 2 bits (3n + 1 to NC 1 and NC 2 each). Obviously this has to be compared with the length of inputs (n + 1 bits). Remarks: The two mechanisms bufferization of data sent by the databases and aggregation of results fulfil databases anonymization. Indeed, even if the client can identify which databases are sending data to SREXM, it can not infer the one which gave the final result. The aggregated value may be returned to the client immediately after a valid match. However, in this case, NC 1 and NC 2 are able to infer the identity of the database who gave the answer. To improve the anonymization, it is necessary to wait, for example until each data from all databases have been processed. Meanwhile this approach is secure, but it is unfortunately not effective because too expensive in term of time. To minimize time cost, we can return intermediate values to the clients each time n results are aggregated which lower the time overcost to n/2. In fact both anonymization mechanisms have different costs: the buffering essentially introduces space cost while aggregation introduces computing time cost. It is of course possible to mix the two mechanism and adapt parameters to adjust anonymization process according to the needs and bearable costs. 
NC 1 computes
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The algorithms NCMP S , S and
S
In this section, we define three algorithms used to implement the secure operator for string comparison, the basic principle of these algorithms is to add uniform random noise to the data which could be deleted from the final result. The S protocol begins with NC 1 and NC 2 who modify their data by doing XOR them with random values (see step 1 in algorithm ). NC 1 and NC 2 share these random values (also see step 1). Garbled data are then send to PS (step 2 and 3) which is now able to compute in a secure way (step 4). In fact, PS gets only garbled inputs indistinguishable from random and unrelated to each others and thus calculates random values from its point of view. To avoid NC 1 and NC 2 from inferring the final result, it does XOR with random noise to the values it calculates before sending them back to NC 1 and NC 2 (step 5). Now NC 1 and NC 2 may both obtain their part of the final result by removing the random noise they added on step 1 (see step 6 and 7). The final result is obtained bay comput-
Using the property of the XOR operator: R R = 0, we get the desired result:
Which is a re-written form of (
However, this operation is never performed by the non collaborative sites and the final result is kept shared between NC 1 and NC 2 .
The S protocol is identical to the S protocol except for the last two steps (steps 6 and 7) performed by NC 1 and NC 2 . Thus we get the final result:
. This reduce to the desired result:
. Which is a re-written form of ( Proof: The input data sent to NC 1 and NC 2 are garbled with random values. Thus they cannot distinguish them from random values. In the same way, all values returned by S are also garbled with unrelated random bits. Thus NC 1 and NC 2 only gets random values and then cannot infer the actual values of the inputs or results. If PS keeps history of intermediate results, it might deduce a part of the aleatory bits that were used to encode its results sent to NC 1 and NC2. However, this gives no information of actual data.
NC 1 computes
A R = A ′ PS ( + X R ′ B ) ( + Y R B ) + X + Y ( + X + Y ) (R B R ′ A ). 7. NC 2 computes B R = B ′ PS ( − X R ′ A ) ( − Y R A ) − X − Y ( − X − Y ) (R A R ′ B ).
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new approach of secured intrusion detection in a collaborative environment. Via our approach an application can use knowledge from foreign databases to identify whether a request corresponds to an attack or not. We have demonstrated that the proposed architecture ensured that it is impossible to identify which database has given the answer and that none of the internal components of the architecture can infer knowledge on the databases or on the request from the data they got. Our approach may also provide the type of the attack when they are specified in the databases. Our current work concern the study of the removal of the fourth semi-honest site CT RL by trying to dispatch its proceedings on the automaton on the three other ones. In parallel, we try to improve the management of the automaton (i.e. introduce more powerful comparison operators).
